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Abstract: 
 
Two experiments tested the hypothesis that priming of performance-related concerns would (1) 
increase the frequency of task-related mind-wandering (i.e., task-related interference; TRI) and 
(2) decrease task performance. In each experiment, sixty female participants completed an 
operation span task (OSPAN) containing thought content probes. The task was framed as a math 
task for those in a condition primed for math-related stereotype threat and as a memory task for 
those in a control condition. In both studies, women whose performance-related concerns were 
primed via stereotype threat reported more TRI than women in the control. The second 
experiment used a more challenging OSPAN task and stereotype primed women also had lower 
math accuracy than controls. These results support the “control failures × current concerns” 
framework of mind-wandering, which posits that the degree to which the environmental context 
triggers personal concerns influences both mind-wandering frequency and content. 
 
Keywords: Mind wandering | Stereotype threat | Executive control 
 
Article:  
 
  
                                                 
* The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Department of Psychology, 296 Eberhart Building, PO Box 
26170, Greensboro, NC 27412, United States 
1. Introduction 
 
Everyone has experienced starting a task, such as reading a journal article, only to find later that 
their thoughts have drifted to something else. Mind-wandering can involve intrusive thoughts 
that are somewhat related to the current task (e.g., “This article is confusing. I’m struggling to 
understand it.”), which is known as task-related interference (TRI). Other times the intrusive 
thoughts are completely unrelated to the task (e.g., “I’m getting hungry. What should I make for 
dinner?”), which are called task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). TUTs have been the primary focus 
of mind-wandering research whereas mind-wandering about task performance is less well-
studied (McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). It has been proposed that the degree to which 
one’s environmental context triggers one’s current concerns influences the frequency and content 
of one’s mind-wandering experiences (McVay & Kane, 2010). The current studies examine the 
effect of priming personal, performance-related concerns on mind-wandering (particularly TRI) 
as well as task performance. 
 
2. Variations in frequency and content of mind-wandering 
 
Mind-wandering occurs frequently with younger adults, on average, spending one third to one 
half of their daily lives thinking about something other than their current task (Kane et al., 2007; 
Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988; McVay, Kane, & Kwapil, 2009). Mind-wandering is even more 
frequent during laboratory tasks (Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay et al., 2013). The frequency of 
mind-wandering varies among individuals, with individuals with lower executive control 
abilities mind-wandering more often (Kane et al., 2007; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) 
than those with higher executive control abilities. 
 
There are contrasting theories explaining the relationship between mind-wandering and 
executive control. One perspective posits that mind-wandering requires executive resources 
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Individuals experience fewer TUTs during tasks with greater 
cognitive loads (Antrobus, 1968; Teasdale et al., 1995). Additionally, in-the-moment TUT 
reports predict performance errors on the ongoing task (Smallwood et al., 2004) and individual 
differences in executive control abilities are positively correlated with TUT frequency on simple 
tasks (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). This suggests that individuals with more 
executive control resources use their additional resources to engage in mind-wandering. 
 
However, other theories of mind-wandering propose that we use our executive resources to 
prevent mind-wandering experiences. According to the “control failures x current concerns” 
framework of mind-wandering proposed by McVay and Kane (2010), off-task thoughts are 
continuously and automatically generated in response to cues in one’s environment, and we use 
executive control resources to prevent these off-task thoughts from entering into conscious 
awareness. Mind-wandering is therefore believed to result from an interplay between one’s 
executive control abilities, one’s motivation to prevent off-task thoughts from entering 
consciousness, and the degree to which the environmental context primes one’s current concerns. 
There is evidence supporting this perspective. Individual differences in TUT frequency are 
positively correlated with control abilities on simple tasks (Levinson et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
frequency of TUTs predicts performance deficits on more attention- demanding tasks (McVay & 
Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2009; Smallwood et al., 2004) as well as executive control attempts 
on ongoing, everyday tasks (Kane et al., 2017). Finally, individuals with greater executive 
control suffer as much as those with lower control in terms of task performance when they 
engage in mind-wandering (McVay & Kane, 2012a, 2012b). These outcomes suggest that, rather 
than using our executive control resources to engage in mind-wandering, we may instead use 
them to try to prevent mind-wandering when the ongoing task is difficult. 
 
In addition to offering predictions regarding the frequency of mind-wandering, the “control 
failures x current concerns” framework can also predict the content of mind-wandering 
experiences. As mentioned, mind-wandering can be about things completely unrelated to the task 
(TUTs) or about concerns that are somewhat related to the task, such as evaluating one’s task 
performance (TRI). TRI differs conceptually from TUTs because they are task-related. However, 
TRI experiences are not quite on-task or directly about responding appropriately to the task 
stimuli and task demands. Although TRI is distinguishable from TUTs, many researchers 
consider TRI to be a variety of mind-wandering, given that TRI and TUTs are similarly 
associated with in-the-moments performance deficits (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 
2013; Mrazek et al., 2011; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005). Research conducted on the 
default mode network (DMN), a brain network that is active when individuals are at rest, has 
revealed that TUTs are associated with higher levels of DMN recruitment and on-task thoughts 
with lower levels of DMN recruitment. While TRI is not associated with as much DMN 
recruitment as TUTs, both TRI and distraction due to external environmental stimuli are 
associated with more DMN recruitment than on-task thoughts (Gonçalves et al., 2017). Given 
these findings, we also characterize TRI as a type of mind-wandering. TRI has been studied less 
frequently than TUTs and the thought probes used in many mind-wandering studies do not 
include TRI as a response option. Participants in these studies may therefore misclassify their 
TRI experiences as being on-task. In laboratory studies that have included TRI as a thought 
probe response option, younger adults report more TUTs, relative to both their TRI and TUTs by 
older adults, whereas older adults report more TRI, relative to both their TUTs and TRI by 
younger adults (Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015; Giambra, 1989; Grodsky & 
Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz, Tamplin, & Radvansky, 2012; McVay & 
Kane, 2012a; McVay et al., 2013). While the typical academic laboratory testing environment 
may cue everyday school-related concerns in younger adults (resulting in increased TUTs) this 
same testing environment may instead trigger concerns about cognitive decline in older adults 
(resulting in increased TRI). Therefore, the finding that younger adults report more TUTs and 
older adults report more TRI corroborates the perspective that one’s current concerns and the 
extent to which they are primed by the environmental context determines frequency and content 
of one’s mind-wandering experiences. 
 
In the current studies, we provide a direct test of the “control failures x current concerns” 
framework by priming performance-related concerns in younger adults and assessing the impact 
on probe-caught off-task thoughts regarding the task (TRI). More specifically, we prime current, 
performance-related concerns in these younger adults using a stereotype threat intervention. 
 
3. Stereotype threat and intrusive thoughts 
 
Stereotype threat, or risk for behaving in a way that confirms a negative stereotype about a group 
one belongs to Steele & Aronson (1995), has been linked to performance deficits on a variety of 
tasks in various marginalized groups. Different mechanisms have been proposed to explain the 
performance impairments typically observed in those under threat (for a review, see Schmader, 
Johns, & Forbes (2008)). These mechanisms include increased physiological stress, increased 
regulation of negative emotions, and increased monitoring of task performance. If a person under 
threat uses their resources to engage in task performance monitoring and active suppression of 
negative emotions (Schmader, Forbes, Zhang, & Mendes, 2009; Schmader et al., 2008; Schuster, 
Martiny, & Schmader, 2015), then fewer resources are available to respond appropriately to task 
stimuli and demands, resulting in impaired performance (Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; 
Cadinu, Maass, Rosabianca, & Kiesner, 2005). 
 
Although it has been proposed that stereotype threat increases task-related worries, research on 
the topic has been limited by the methodologies used to measure off-task thoughts. For example, 
previous work on stereotype threat and off-task thoughts has relied primarily on open verbal 
reports of intrusive thoughts. Coding schemes for these verbal reports may not include both 
TUTs and TRI (Cadinu et al., 2005) or may rely on participants thinking back and reporting on 
their mind-wandering episodes after the testing session is completed (Beilock et al., 2007). 
Retrospective mind-wandering assessments may result in mind-wandering episodes being 
systematically overlooked, because individuals may not always recognize or remember when 
their thoughts have drifted (Schooler, 2002; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). 
 
Mrazek et al. (2011) examined the effect of math-gender stereotype threat on mind-wandering 
using online thought probes during a challenging math task. However, the methodology of this 
study has limited application to the current questions. The online thought probes used to assess 
mind-wandering asked participants to indicate, on a Likert-scale from 1 to 10, the degree to 
which participants were mind-wandering immediately before the probe appeared, and did not 
include different categories of mind-wandering for participants to choose from. Retrospective 
thought content assessments were administered after the testing session. A simultaneous 
regression predicting probe-caught mind-wandering from retrospective TUTs and retrospective 
TRI revealed that the online thought-probes were more strongly related to retrospective TUTs 
rather than retrospective TRI, although past research suggests that threat leads to increased 
worry-laden task evaluation of performance, which corresponds to TRI (Beilock et al., 2007; 
Cadinu et al., 2005). These results are dependent on participants’ retrospective memories of what 
they were mind-wandering about during the testing session. 
 
The current studies examine the effect of priming personal, performance-related concerns on 
mind-wandering by using a stereotype threat manipulation. Mind-wandering is assessed during a 
task with a mathematical component following priming of math-gender stereotype. Critically, 
mind wandering is measured using online-thought probes embedded in the task that provide 
participants with a variety of relevant thought content options, including TRI. Both task 
performance (number of errors and response time) and eye movement data corroborate online 
thought probes as a measure of mind-wandering (Frank et al., 2015). This thought probe 
approach will not only allow a test of the “control failures × current concerns” framework of 
mind-wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010), but will also provide a better understanding of what 
types of intrusive thoughts individuals under stereotype threat experience. We predict that 
stereotype threat priming will lead to increased worry-laden monitoring of performance, 
reflected in increased TRI. Furthermore, we predict that individuals under stereotype threat will 
have worse performance on a task in the stereotyped domain than individuals who are not 
systematically primed for stereotype threat. 
 
4. Experimental overview 
 
To test these hypotheses, two experiments were completed. Online thought probes were used to 
measure mind-wandering frequency and content. Study 1 tested the effect of priming math-
gender stereotype threat on mind-wandering and math verification accuracy during an automated 
Operation Span Task (OSPAN; Conway et al., 2005). Study 2 provides a theoretical replication 
of Study 1 using a more challenging version of the OSPAN. These studies, using more precise 
online thought probes, provide us with the opportunity to examine how current concern priming 
affects mind-wandering and task performance, and to discern whether TRI is partially 
responsible for the harmful effects of stereotype threat on task performance. 
 
5. Study 1 method 
 
5.1. Participants 
 
Sixty female undergraduate students from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated in exchange for course credit (M age = 19.10, SD = 1.24). Half of the participants 
were tested in the stereotype threat condition, and the other half in the control condition. All of 
these participants were included in the analyses described below. We did not want participants to 
suspect that the current study was about stereotype threat or gender differences in cognition. 
Therefore we also recruited and tested male participants. Male participants were tested in both 
the control and stereotype threat conditions together with the female participants, but only the 
data of female participants were included in the following analyses.1 
 
5.2. Design and procedure 
 
All measures and experimental manipulations for this study are reported below.2 Study 1 was a 
between-subjects design comparing the frequency of mind-wandering among female 
undergraduates primed for stereotype threat relative to women in a control condition. Because 
the goal of the current study was to examine the effects of priming performance-related concerns 
on mind-wandering, we wanted to make sure we successfully primed stereotype threat in the 
experimental group. To do this, we primed stereotype threat in a couple different ways. 
 
Participants in the experimental condition were told that the OSPAN task they were about to 
complete was a task that measures “quantitative ability” and that the task had revealed gender 
differences in the past. These participants were also tested by a male experimenter. The majority 
of control and stereotype threat sessions contained at least one male participant. We had a male 
confederate act as a participant in the stereotype threat condition sessions in the event that no 
male students signed up for that session. In the control condition, participants were told that the 
OSPAN task they were about to complete measured “memory ability” and that this task was 
gender-fair. Control participants were tested by a female experimenter. Participants in both 
groups were told that they would receive feedback for their performance. 
 
Before completing the OSPAN participants completed a modified Gender-Science Implicit 
Associations Task (IAT; Nosek & Smyth, 2007). This IAT was designed to measure the 
participants’ automatic associations between the concepts of “math” and “liberal arts” and 
gender. This measure was included as a manipulation check. If we had not found the anticipated 
group differences in mind-wandering or task performance, we could use these IAT scores to 
further evaluate the effectiveness of our stereotype threat priming procedure.3 
 
After instruction, participants completed a modified, automatic OSPAN. The OSPAN is a 
measure of working memory capacity that requires participants to switch back and forth between 
verifying relatively simple math equations and viewing letters that must be remembered for a 
later recall task. At the end of each OSPAN trial participants must, in correct serial order, recall 
the letters presented to them during the trial. The OSPAN for Study 1 consisted of 130 trials with 
set sizes (numbers of consecutive equation/letter pairs) varying between 2 and 3. Although the 
OSPAN is a measure of working memory, we chose it as our main experimental task because it 
could be framed as either a math task or as a gender-fair memory task, depending on the 
experimental condition, providing us with stereotype threat manipulation. Both math verification 
and letter recall accuracy were recorded during the testing session. 
 
During the OSPAN participants responded to a total of 10 thought probes which appeared at 
quasi-random intervals (spacing was approximately every 2 min; see Seli, Carriere, Levene, & 
Smilek, 2013). Probes could appear (1) after participants saw the final math equation within a 
trial, but before they verified the answer for that equation, (2) after the final math equation within 
the trial had been verified, but before the final letter to be remembered was presented, or (3) at 
the end of the trial after the participant saw the last letter to be remembered. OSPAN trials in 
which a thought probe appeared were dropped from the OSPAN analyses reported below. 
Participants responded to the probes using their computer keypad and were instructed to indicate 
what they were thinking about immediately before the probe appeared: 
 
What were you just thinking about?  
 
(1) The task: Focused on completing the task, verifying equations, and remembering letters 
(2) Task approach: Thinking about how you can improve your task performance  
(3) Task evaluation: Evaluating how effective you were completing the task, or worrying about 
task performance  
(4) Everyday things: Thinking about recent or impeding life events  
(5) Current state of being: Thinking about conditions such as hunger or sleepiness  
(6) Personal worries: Thinking about concerns, troubles, or fears not related to the experimental 
task  
(7) Daydreams: Fantasies disconnected from reality  
(8) Other. 
 
Using these online thought probes we calculated the mean proportions of probe caught TUT, 
TRI, and on-task thoughts. In the current study, we also separated TRI into two different sub-
types. It has been suggested that ST primarily increases worry-laden monitoring of task 
performance (Schmader et al., 2008), which we label “reactive TRI”, corresponding to Option 3 
in the thought probe example above. However, we believe it is also possible that TRI can also be 
about task approach or strategy, which we label “proactive TRI”, corresponding to Option 2 
above. Furthermore, we believed this proactive form of mind-wandering about task approach 
might have downstream benefits in terms of task performance, even if experiencing these 
thoughts harm performance in the moment. 
 
In addition to online thought probes, we included a retrospective measure of thought content. 
The Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews, Joyner, Gililand, Huggins, & 
Falconer, 1999), includes eight questions that assess TUTs (e.g. “I thought about something that 
happened to me earlier”) and eight questions that assess TRI (e.g. “I thought about how I should 
work more carefully”). The DSSQ has been used in other mind-wandering studies (Mrazek et al. 
(2011)) and was included here to see if it corroborated the results of the online thought probes. 
 
In addition to the TUT and TRI subscales, the Motivation subscale of the DSSQ was also 
included. The Motivation subscale consists of seven questions that measure motivation to do 
well on the experimental task (the OSPAN), along with seven items that measure participants’ 
interest in the content of the experimental task. The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (The 
PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988) was included as a measure of mood, as mood may be 
expected to influence the frequency of mind-wandering (Kane et al., 2007; Smallwood, 
Fitzgerald, Miles, & Phillips, 2009). We also included several post-task questions about 
perceived task difficulty, perceived fatigue during the OSPAN, and perceived stress during the 
OSPAN, as these may also be expected to influence frequency of mind wandering (Kane et al., 
2007). To assess possible reactivity, we asked participants what they thought the study was about 
after they completed all tasks. No participants indicated believing that the study was about 
stereotype threat or gender differences in cognition. 
 
6. Study 1 results and discussion 
 
6.1. Performance and mind-wandering 
 
Table 1 contains means and standard errors for OSPAN and post-task measures. As shown 
in Figure. 1, the proportion of probe-caught TRI was higher in stereotype threat primed 
participants (M = 0.210, SE = 0.026) than in control participants (M = 0.127, SE = 0.023), F (1, 
58) = 5.669, p = 0.021, d = 0.636. Participants primed for stereotype threat reported more 
intrusive off-task thoughts about task performance and task strategy than participants who were 
not primed for threat. Likewise, participants in the control condition were more likely to indicate 
being on-task (M = 0.463, SE = 0.041) than participants primed for stereotype threat 
(M = 0.370, SE = 0.041), although this difference did not reach statistical significance (F (1, 
58) = 2.694, p = 0.106). 
 
 
 
We expected that individuals could engage in TRI regarding task strategy (“proactive TRI”) or 
TRI regarding evaluating one’s task performance (“reactive TRI”). Participants primed for 
stereotype threat engaged in both of these subtypes of TRI. Primed participants reported a higher 
proportion of TRI regarding task evaluation (M = 0.123, SE = 0.020) compared to the control 
group (M = 0.087, SE = 0.017), F (1, 58) = 1.923, p = 0.171, although this difference was not 
statistically significant. Primed participants also reported a significantly higher proportion of TRI 
regarding task approach or task strategy (M = 0.097, SE = 0.023) than control participants 
(M = 0.040, SE = 0.010), F (1, 58) = 5.158, p = 0.027, d = 0.571. These results suggest that not 
only do those under threat potentially reflect more upon their task performance, but they may 
also think more about ways to improve task performance than those who do not experience 
threat. 
 
Although we had thought that proactive TRI might be beneficial for task performance, proactive 
TRI was not positively correlated with math verification accuracy in either the control condition 
(r = -0.098, p = 0.605) or the stereotype threat primed condition (r = 0.085, p = 0.715).4 
 
Although Mrazek et al. (2011) determined that their probe-caught mind- wandering reports were 
more closely related to retrospective TUTs in participants primed for stereotype threat, we found 
using online thought probes that stereotype threat primed and control participants did not differ 
in terms of probe-caught TUTs (F (1, 58) = 0.160, p = 0.691). Primed participants were off-task 
more than control participants, but group differences in mind- wandering were driven by 
differences in TRI rather than TUTs. 
 
Although we found that stereotype primed participants reported increased TRI and decreased on-
task thoughts compared to controls, we did not replicate the standard stereotype threat effect on 
task performance. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, threat participants (M = 90.933, SE = 0.727) 
did not have worse math verification accuracy than control participants, 
(M = 91.700, SE = 0.736), F (1, 58) = 1.801, p = 0.185. Letter recall accuracy also did not differ 
between the two conditions (F (1, 58) = 0.243, p = 0.624). 
 
6.2. Post-task survey measures 
 
Stereotype threat priming did not have an effect on the Task Unrelated Thinking (p = 571) and 
Task-Related Interference (p = 0.156) subscales of the DSSQ, although primed participants 
reported significantly more probe-caught TRI. This suggests that participants may not always be 
able to accurately report mind-wandering after time has elapsed between the mind-wandering 
experience and the mind-wandering assessment (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In both 
conditions, scores on the TRI subscale of the DSSQ were not correlated with probe-caught TRI 
(r = 0.000, p = 0.997 for controls and r = -0.063, p = 0.811 for primed participants). 
 
Although it has been proposed that increased anxiety may be one mechanism by which 
stereotype threat undermines task performance (Schmader et al., 2008), we found no effect of 
stereotype threat priming on the post-task question about perceived stress (F (1, 
58) = 0.472, p = 0.838). However, primed participants did perceive the OSPAN to be more 
fatiguing than did control participants (F (1, 58) = 18.006, p < 0.001, d = 1.12). We found no 
effect of stereotype threat on self-reported positive affect (F (1, 58) = 0.305, p = 0.583) or 
negative affect (F (1, 58) = 461, p = 0.500). Likewise, the two conditions did not differ in terms 
of self-reported motivation (p = 0.787) or perceived difficulty of math verification (p = 0.626) 
OSPAN trials. 
 
7. Study 2 goals 
 
Study 1 addressed the impact of priming personal, performance-related concerns on mind-
wandering and task performance using a stereotype threat manipulation. As predicted, priming 
stereotype threat resulted in increased mind-wandering, particularly TRI. While participants 
primed for threat reported more TRI in general, participants in both conditions reported mind-
wandering about task evaluation as well as task strategy. Although participants primed for threat 
reported fewer on-task thoughts than controls, they did not report more TUTs. The stereotype 
threat manipulation cued performance-related concerns, but did not increase concerns about 
things unrelated to the experimental task. This pattern of results is consistent with the “control 
failures × current concerns” framework of mind-wandering (2010). 
 
We did not find an effect of stereotype threat priming on OSPAN performance in Study 1, 
contrary to our expectations. Participants primed for threat did as well on the math verification 
portion of the OSPAN as the control participants. Math verification accuracy and letter recall 
accuracy were quite high for both groups. It is possible that the mathematical component of the 
OSPAN, which involved set sizes of 2 or 3 relatively simple math verification problems, was not 
challenging enough to induce stereotype threat-related performance deficits. Although stereotype 
threat primed participants reported significantly more TRI, they did not report more stress or 
negative affect than control participants, which are mechanisms believed to contribute to 
performance deficits in individuals under threat (Schmader et al., 2008; Schmader et al., 2009). 
 
Study 2 was designed to replicate Study 1 and to assess the impact that stereotype threat has on 
mind-wandering and performance using a more challenging task. We predict that stereotype 
threat primed participants will again report more TRI (but not necessarily more TUTs) and will 
have worse OSPAN math verification accuracy compared to control participants. 
 
8. Study 2 method 
 
8.1. Participants 
 
As in Study 1, sixty female undergraduate students from the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro participated in exchange for course credit (M age = 19.25, SD = 1.12). All of these 
participants were included in the analyses described below. As in Study 1, male participants were 
also tested in both conditions, but only the data of female participants were included in the 
following analyses1. 
 
8.2. Procedure 
 
We primed math-gender stereotype in the same way as Study 1. In Study 2, however, 
participants completed a more challenging version of the OSPAN that included 81 trials and had 
set sizes varying between 3, 4, and 5. Nine thought probes appeared at quasi-random intervals 
during the OSPAN and participants were again instructed to use their keypads to indicate what 
they were thinking about immediately before the probe appeared. The thoughts probe used were 
the same as in Study 1 and probes were placed in the same locations within the OSPAN task as 
in Study 1. As in Study 1, OSPAN trials containing a thought probe were dropped from the 
analyses reported. The same post-task surveys and questions that were included in Study 1 were 
included in Study 2. 
 
9. Study 2 results and discussion 
 
9.1. Performance and mind-wandering 
 
Study 2 replicated the mind-wandering findings of Study 1 using a more challenging 
experimental task. As shown in Table 1 and Figure. 1, probe-caught TRI was higher in the 
stereotype threat primed participants (M = 0.161, SE = 0.035) than in the control participants 
(M = 0.080, SE = 0.032), F (1, 58) = 5.527, p = 0.022, d = 0.423. Control participants were more 
likely to indicate being on-task (M = 0.541, SE = 0.043) than stereotype threat primed 
participants (M = 0.352, SE = 0.051), F (1, 58) = 7.916, p = 0.007, d = 0.733. Again, although 
the stereotype threat participants reported more TRI than controls, the groups did not differ in 
reported TUTs, F (1, 58) = 1.826, p = 0.182. The group differences in mean proportion of on-
task thoughts were driven by group differences in TRI rather than TUTs. 
 
As in Study 1, participants reported both subtypes of TRI. Although group differences were not 
statistically significant, primed participants reported numerically more TRI regarding task 
evaluation (M = 0.084, SE = 0.015) compared to control participants 
(M = 0.035, SE = 0.021), F (1, 58) = 3.600, p = 0.063. Although this difference did not reach 
statistical significance it is possible that those under threat reflected more upon their task 
performance. Although this difference did not reach statistical significance, primed participants 
also reported numerically more TRI regarding task strategy (M = 0.077, SE = 0.017) than control 
participants (M = 0.045, SE = 0.017), F (1, 58) = 1.772, p = 0.188. Those under threat may have 
also been more likely to think about ways to improve task performance. However, engaging in 
proactive TRI did not seem to improve performance. Probe-caught proactive TRI was not 
positively correlated with task performance in either condition (r = -0.268, p = 0.153 for control 
and r = −0.096, p = 0.613 for stereotype threat primed) (see Footnote 4). 
 
Using a more challenging OSPAN task, we replicated the standard stereotype threat effect on 
task performance. Participants primed for math-gender stereotype threat 
(M = 90.600, SE = 5.014) had worse math verification accuracy than control participants 
(M = 94.100, SE = 2.280), F (1, 58) = 12.11, p = 0.001, d = 0.164. There were no group 
differences in letter recall accuracy, F (1, 58) = 0.268, p = 0.790. 
 
9.2. Other measures 
 
As in Study 1, we found no effect of stereotype threat priming on retrospective TUTs and TRI as 
measured by the DSSQ. Again, participants may not always be able to accurately report 
instances of mind-wandering after some time has elapsed between the mind-wandering 
experience and the mind-wandering assessment (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). As in Study 1, 
we did not find that scores on the TRI subscale of the DSSQ correlated with probe-caught TRI in 
the control participants (r = 0.260, p = 0.166). However, DSSQ TRI scores did correlate with 
probe-caught TRI in the stereotype threat primed participants (r = 0.379, p = 0.039). We found 
no condition differences for the post-task questions regarding perceived stress (F (1, 
58) = 0.472, p = 0.495), perceived fatigue (F (1, 58) = 1.315, p = 0.256), positive affect (F (1, 
58) = 0.102, p = 0.751), and negative affect (F(1, 58) = 0.253, p = 0.617). Likewise, the two 
conditions did not differ in terms of reported motivation to do the task well (as measured by the 
Motivation subscale of the DSSQ; p = 323) and perceived difficulty of the math verification 
portion of the OSPAN (p = 0.203). 
 
10. General discussion 
The present studies demonstrate that priming of personal, performance-related current concerns 
can increase mind-wandering, particularly mind-wandering regarding task strategy and task 
evaluation (TRI). In Study 1, female undergraduates primed for math-gender stereotype threat 
reported more TRI than female undergraduate controls. In Study 2, which employed a more 
challenging task, female undergraduates primed for math-gender stereotype threat reported more 
TRI than female undergraduate controls and also had worse performance on the mathematical 
component of the experimental task. As noted in Footnote 1, our stereotype threat manipulation 
appears to have differentially affected male and female participants. For both studies, male 
participants tested in the control and stereotype threat conditions did not differ from each other in 
terms on TRI or math verification performance, while female participants in the two conditions 
did. This suggests that the experimental manipulation did not induce general, math-related 
anxiety in participants that were tested in the control condition, but rather specifically primed 
performance-related concerns in female participants under stereotype threat. 
 
In addition to supporting the “control failures × current concerns” framework of mind- 
wandering (McVay & Kane, 2010), these studies support current theories of stereotype threat. 
The Study 2 findings are consistent with an explanation that stereotype threat undermines task 
performance through increases in metacognitive thoughts, which can result in the depletion of 
executive control resources (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001; Croizet et al., 2004; 
Inzlicht, McKay, & Aronson, 2006; Schamder & Johns, 2003). While past work has suggested 
that stereotype threat may decouple one’s attention from the current task in a way that leads to 
increases in task-unrelated thoughts (Mrazek et al., 2011), the present studies find that stereotype 
threat increases thoughts related to the current task. 
 
In the current studies, participants primed for stereotype threat did not report increased stress and 
increased negative mood compared to controls, which are proposed mechanisms by which 
stereotype threat leads to increased off-task thoughts and worse performance on the stereotyped 
task. In addition to work in the stereotype threat literature suggesting that increases in anxiety 
and suppression of worry-laden thoughts impair task performance, work within the mind-
wandering literature also suggests that valence predicts whether off-task thoughts will disrupt 
performance. Benny and Banks (2015) demonstrated that negatively valenced TRI episodes in 
particular predict poor performance, at least on higher demand tasks. In the current studies, we 
did not have participants rate the emotional valence of their mind-wandering episodes. It is also 
worth noting that in the current studies, it remains unclear whether our stereotype type threat 
manipulation influences participants’ thought content by specifically increasing worry-laden 
thoughts or by increasing task diligence in those under threat. Future studies can be done to 
further investigate how emotion interacts with mind-wandering to affect task performance 
(particularly in those under stereotype threat) and whether stereotype threat interventions 
increase TRI through prompting distracting worry-laden thoughts or by more generally 
increasing task vigilance. 
 
The thought probe methodology used in the current studies offers a more nuanced way to assess 
mind-wandering than methodologies used in past studies of stereotype threat and intrusive 
thoughts. Memory-demanding retrospective thought content questionnaires and verbal report 
coding schemes carry the risk of mind-wandering episodes being overlooked or forgotten by 
participants. Using more detailed online thought probes, we lend support to previous research 
demonstrating that stereotype threat specifically leads to increased task-related worries and 
metacognitions (Beilock et al., 2007; Cadinu et al., 2005). We did find that not only did 
stereotype threat participants report intrusive thoughts about task performance evaluation, but 
they also reported more intrusive thoughts about task strategy. Although we found no evidence 
in the current studies that TRI about task strategy aided performance, it is possible that mind-
wandering about task strategy may have downstream benefits for task performance on different 
tasks, longer tasks, or across multiple task sessions. Future studies can be done to determine 
under which situations mind-wandering about task strategy can benefit task performance. 
 
We found differences in the breakdown of proactive and reactive TRI. Stereotype threat primed 
participants in Study 1, which had a lower task demand, reported numerically more proactive 
TRI than control participants. Stereotype threat primed participants in Study 2, which had a 
higher task demand, reported numerically more reactive TRI. It is possible that, at least in 
threatened individuals, tasks with a higher demand leads to more evaluative of task performance, 
but not more thinking about task strategies. More work can be done to determine how threat and 
task demands differentially alter these two different types of TRI. 
 
We labeled TRI about task strategy as “proactive TRI” because we believed that participants 
could think about strategies that they could implement on upcoming trials of the experimental 
task. Although participants reported thinking about task strategy, it is possible that they were not 
actually thinking about potentially beneficial strategies to implement on future trials. Instead, 
participants could have been evaluating past or current strategies when they endorsed proactive 
TRI on the thought probes. We did not necessary expect evaluative thoughts about task strategy 
to lead to improved task performance within the current task. Participants may adopt either 
effective or ineffective strategies when completing the OSPAN (Dunlosky & Kane, 2007). It is 
possible that even if participants in these studies thought about new strategies to use on future 
OSPAN trials, they were not generating effective strategies that would improve performance. 
More research is needed to determine the exact content of participants’ thoughts when they 
endorse TRI on online thought probes. 
 
Overall, the current studies provide a test with replication of the “control failures x current 
concerns” framework of mind-wandering proposed by McVay and Kane (2010). In addition to 
demonstrating that priming personal, performance-related concerns in younger adults leads to 
increased TRI, the current studies can provide insight into why older adults consistently report 
less overall mind-wandering but more TRI than younger adults (Frank et al., 2015; Giambra, 
1989; Grodsky & Giambra, 1990; Jackson & Balota, 2012; Krawietz et al., 2012; McVay & 
Kane, 2012a; McVay et al., 2013). The results of the current younger adult studies suggest that 
stereotype threat increases TRI. Future research can examine whether memory-related stereotype 
threat may account for the increased TRI typically reported by older adults. The “control failures 
x current concerns” framework (McVay & Kane, 2010) can be further tested by systemically 
priming everyday concerns in younger and older adults, and examining whether this 
manipulation increases TUT reports. 
 
Appendix A. Supplementary material 
 
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017. 08.002. 
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1 Although we were primarily interested in the effect of math-gender stereotype threat on TRI and task performance, 
data from male participants was also collected for both studies and for both conditions. For Study 1 we collected 
data from 49 male participants (24 control and 25 experimental). For Study 1, a 2x2 factorial ANOVA for probe-
caught TRI with gender and condition included as between-subjects factors revealed a gender by group interaction 
(F (1112) = 9.202, p = 0.003). However, there was no main effect of gender (p = 0.083), although female 
participants (M = 0.17, SD = 0.13) reported numerically more TRI than male participants (M = 0.13, SD = 0.10). 
There was also no main effect of group (p = 0.456). If the stereotype threat manipulation inadvertently lead to 
general math anxiety in participants within the experimental group, we might have expected a group difference, with 
experimental participants reporting more TRI than control participants. This was not the case. Control participants 
(M = 0.14, SD = 0.12) reported roughly the same amount of TRI as participants tested in the stereotype threat 
condition (M = 0.17, SD = 0.12). 
 
                                                 
                                                                                                                                                             
A 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA for math verification accuracy with gender and condition included as between-subjects 
factors did not reveal a main effect of group (p = 0.921). Control participants (M = 91.54, SD = 3.70) and 
experimental participants (M = 91.40, SD = 3.62) had very similar math verification performance. Again, if the 
stereotype threat manipulation inadvertently lead to general math anxiety in participants within the experimental 
group, we might have expected a group difference, with experimental participants performing more poorly on the 
math verification portion of the OSPAN than control participants. The factorial ANOVA likewise did not reveal a 
main effect of gender (p = 0.642). Female (M = 91.32, SD = 3.99) and male (M = 91.65, SD = 3.19) participants had 
similar math verification performance. There was no group ∗ gender interaction (p = 0.970). 
 
Male participants in the study 1 control condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.10) and experimental condition 
(M = 0.10, SD = 0.10) did not differ significantly from each other in terms of probe-caught TRI (p = 0.505), 
suggesting that the stereotype threat manipulation did not lead to math anxiety or an increase in performance-related 
concerns in male participants within the experimental group that received a stereotype threat manipulation. In the 
study 1 control condition, male participants (M = 0.16, SD = 0.10) and female participants (M = 0.13, SD = 0.13) did 
not differ significantly in terms of probe-caught TRI (p = 0.076). This suggests that female control participants were 
not experiencing a greater degree of performance-related concerns than male participants. 
 
Study 2 included data from 35 male participants (18 control and 17 experimental). A 2x2 factorial ANOVA for 
probe-caught TRI with gender and condition as between- subjects factors revealed a gender by group interaction 
(F (1,95) = 5.600, p = 0.020) but not main effects of gender (p = 0.928) or group (p = 0.532). Female participants 
(M = 0.13, SD = 0.17) and male participants (M = 0.13, SD = 0.14) reported the same amount of probe-caught TRI. 
Control participants (M = 0.11, SD = 0.11) reported numerically less TRI compared to participants tested in the 
stereotype threat condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.19), but this difference was not significant. 
 
A 2 × 2 factorial ANOVA for math verification accuracy with gender and condition included as between-subjects 
factors revealed a gender by group interaction (F (1,95) = 5.583, p = 0.020) and a main effect of group 
(F (1,95) = 6.016, p = 0.016), with control participants (M = 93.65, SD = 2.33) obtaining higher math verification 
accuracy than experimental participants (M = 91.40, SD = 3.65). There was no main effect of gender (p = 0.488). 
Female (M = 92.35, SD = 4.25) and male (M = 92.86, SD = 2.32) participants had similar math verification 
performance. The fact that control female participants performed similarly on the math task to control male 
participants suggests that female participants within the control group were not experiencing stereotype threat. 
 
Males in the control (M = 0.16, SD = 0.10) condition reported more TRI than males in the experimental condition 
(M = 0.11, SD = 0.16), but this difference was not significant (p = 0.717). Males in the control 
(M = 92.89, SD = 2.30) and experimental (M = 92.82, SD = 2.40) conditions likewise did not differ from each other 
in terms of OSPAN math verification accuracy (p = 0.878). Again, this would suggest that the stereotype threat 
manipulation did not lead to increased math anxiety in males within the experimental condition. Control condition 
males (M = 92.89, SD = 2.30) and females (M = 94.10, SD = 2.28) did not differ in terms of OSPAN math 
verification accuracy (p = 0.965). Again, the fact that control female participants performed similarly on the math 
task to control male participants suggests that female participants within the control group were not experiencing 
stereotype threat. Control condition males (M = 0.16, SD = 0.10) and females (M = 0.08, SD = 0.10) also did not 
differ significantly in terms of probe-caught TRI (p = 0.973). 
 
The patterns above support the experimental manipulation as impacting TRI frequency during the task due to 
gender-based stereotype threat regarding math performance. 
2 In addition to the measures described within the text of this article, the following additional measures were 
included. These are not central to the study but are reported here in the interest of full and open reporting. The 
Interest subscale of the Dundee Stress State Questionnaire (DSSQ; Matthews, Joyner, Gililand, Huggins, & 
Falconer) was included as a measure of task interest, along with a single-item post-task question about task interest. 
In addition to a single-item question about perceived difficulty of the math verification portion of the OSPAN, 
participants responded to a single-item question about their perceived overall OSPAN task difficulty. Participants 
answered a single-item question about how focused they were on accurately verifying math equations and how 
focused they were on accurately recalling letters during the OSPAN. To further measure task effort and motivation, 
participants responded to single-item post-task questions about how satisfied they were with their OSPAN 
performance, how much effort they put into the OSPAN, and how well they thought they did on the OSPAN. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Participants also responded to a single-item post-task question regarding how distracted they felt that they were 
during the OSPAN, whether they had to read the OSPAN task instructions multiple times before understanding 
them, and whether they believed a negative stereotype regarding females being inferior in mathematical abilities 
existed in society. Finally, participants responded to the Locus, Anxiety, and Achievement scales of the 
Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (MIA; Dixon & Hultsch). In both studies, the means for these variables 
did not differ between the control and primed conditions (all p values > 0.05). 
 
3 We predicted that participants primed for math-gender stereotype threat would be slower to pair the categories of 
“female” and “math” together than they would to pair the categories of “male” and “math” together. We found that 
primed participants in Study 1 were slower to pair the categories of “female” and “math” together compared to 
control participants in Study 1 (F (1, 58) = 7.374, p = 0.009). In Study 2, the group differences were marginal (F (1, 
58) = 3.637, p = 0.064), but primed participants were likewise slower to pair the categories of “female” and “math” 
together. These IAT findings combined with the mind-wandering differences obtained in both studies indicate that 
our priming manipulation successfully elevated math-gender stereotype threat in our stereotype threat condition. 
 
4 To further examine the effect of different thought types on OSPAN performance, we compared math verification 
and letter recall accuracy on OSPAN sets immediately following probes where proactive TRI was reported, probes 
where reactive TRI was reported, and probes where TUTs were reported. These analyses suggest that engaging in 
proactive TRI is not more beneficial for immediate task performance than engaging in reactive TRI or TUTs. 
One-way ANCOVAs were conducted to determine the effect of thought probe response (proactive TRI, reactive 
TRI, and TUTs) on performance for sets immediately following probes were mind-wandering was reported, 
controlling for set size. For OSPAN sets following a thought probe where mind-wandering was reported, two 
measures of accuracy were calculated. A measure of math verification accuracy was calculated as the number of 
correctly verified math problems out of the total number of math problems within a set. For each set, participants got 
the letter recall portion correct if they were able to recall all letters within the set in correct serial order. 
For Study 1, there was no significant effect of thought type on set-level math verification accuracy when controlling 
for set size, F(3, 330) = 0.451, p = 0.637. Math verification accuracy on sets following probes were proactive TRI 
was reported (M = 0.9356, SD = 0.9356) was no different than accuracy on sets following probes were reactive TRI 
(M = 0.9281, SD = 0.2074) and TUTs (M = 0.9100, SD = 0.1825) were reported. Similarly, there was no significant 
effect of thought type on set-level letter recall accuracy when controlling for set size, F(3, 330) = 0.447, p = 0.640. 
Letter recall accuracy on sets following probes were proactive TRI was reported (M = 0.9167, SD = 0.2803) was no 
different than accuracy on sets following probes were reactive TRI (M = 0.9403, SD = 0.2387) and TUTs 
(M = 0.9031, SD = 0.2965) were reported. 
 
The same pattern of results was observed for Study 2. There was no significant effect of thought type on set-level 
math verification accuracy when controlling for set size, F(3, 330) = 0.313, p = 0.731. Math verification accuracy on 
sets following probes were proactive TRI was reported (M = 0.9413, SD = 0.1377) was no different than accuracy 
on sets following probes were reactive TRI (M = 0.9279, SD = 0.1541) and TUTs (M = 0.9148, SD = 0.1936) were 
reported. Similarly, there was no significant effect of thought type on set-level letter recall accuracy when 
controlling for set size, F(3, 330) = 0.248, p = 0.781. Letter recall accuracy on sets following probes were proactive 
TRI was reported (M = 0.9286, SD = 0.2598) was no different than accuracy on sets following probes were reactive 
TRI (M = 0.9245, SD = 0.2667) and TUTs (M = 0.9441, SD = 0.2306) were reported. 
 
